

Psychosynthesis Research Foundation

ROOM 314, 527 LEXINGTON AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017
TEL: PLAZA 9-1480

REGISTERED OFFICE
TREASURER
602 BELLEVUE RD.
WILMINGTON, DELA.

5355 Henry Hudson Parkway
Riverdale 71, N.Y.

Tel: KI 9-6677

April 7, 1964

Dear Colleague:

The next PSYCHOSYNTHESIS MEETING will be held as
follows:

TIME: 3:00 P.M. - Saturday, April 18, 1964.

PLACE: Manhattan College, Riverdale, N.Y.
Room 3-B Thomas Hall (one floor above entrance level).

SUBJECT: Discussion of the self.

Cordially,

Jack Cooper, M.D.

SIXTH

PSYCHOSYNTHESIS MEETING

Saturday, April 18, 1964 - Manhattan College, New York

Discussion on the Self

Participants:

John Adkins, Ph.D.
Jerry Cashman, M.A.
Jack Cooper, M.D.

Frank Hilton, F.C.I.I.
Brother Luke, Th.D.
Patrick F. Mullahy, M.A.
Fabian Rouke, Ph.D.

Chairman, Jack Cooper:

The subject today is basic, although to quote from a letter from Bill Swartley - telling us that he is not able to come today - "it is awfully vague." He added: "I thought we decided to discuss specific cases and techniques"; but as you know, our last meeting naturally led into today's topic. I would like to contribute a few introductory remarks. First, has everyone read the Assagioli article on Self-Realization and Psychological Disturbances? I think it would be wise for everybody to re-read it and to think of it in terms of what we are trying to do today. Now from a psychiatric standpoint, the first inkling that I know of, of changes in the human psyche in the way of expansion of the psyche, came from Dr. Maurice Bucke. In Cosmic Consciousness which he wrote at the turn of the century, he gave a list of some 40 cases in which he detailed a rather interesting set of findings. He used the life of Jesus, the life of Paul, Walt Whitman and several others, and detailed that at around 30 to 40 years of age a rather interesting development occurred in human beings. He discussed this as "cosmic consciousness"; he said the experience is transcendental, and that it is difficult to put into words. People who had it would generally become changed in some psychological way. He postulates that first there is instinctual mind, then the development of self-consciousness or consciousness of self, and then a moving along into a third consciousness which he refers to as "cosmic consciousness." One of the things that he talked about was that the experience which these individuals went through altered their consciousness. He detailed it as happening between 30 and 50 years of age, and that common to all the cases was some change in their perception of light, and that they developed a conscience or a sudden desire to do right. William James, a psychologist, wrote Varieties of Religious Experiences and it is a classic today. Both of them brought out this particular phenomenon or experience - William James refers to a "mystical consciousness." A rather interesting thing has happened and I want to invite your attention to it.

In Bucke's and James' day the majority of the population did not live much beyond 35 and 40 years of age. In my lifetime as a physician I have seen the phenomenon of an aging population - Billy the Kid who was one of the gunmen of the West lived and died before he was 25 years of age. Pneumonia was labelled in those days "the friend of the aged," because it killed people so rapidly. Even in 1941 when I was an intern we did not see too much aging. But since the forties, since the discovery of the antibiotics - we started out first with the sulfa compounds and penicillin and we saw pneumonia disappear. We saw a population growth. So today people live well beyond the age of 45. We now have almost 20 million in the U.S. over 65. We have nearly 8 or 9,000 people over 90, which is interesting.

Now if this alteration of consciousness occurs in the neighborhood of 30 to 50 years of age - which Bucke calls 'cosmic consciousness', which James details as 'mystical consciousness' - then there must be more people now with this type of consciousness.

Assagioli in his paper, "Self-Realization and Psychological Disturbances" refers to this phenomenon as Self and he states that in it we have intuition, creativity, the will and the very core of the human psyche. Goldstein, Maslow, Allport, Baruk, Fromm, Jung, May, Progoff, Rank, Caruso and Frankl also discuss this inner Self. I'd like to add to them Tournier, who, in his book, Meaning of Persons, also describes change or alterations in consciousness.

There are diseases which develop as a result of this 'awakening' experience. I have seen a number of them, they do not fit the standard psychiatric theory; most do not respond to the orthodox analytic or other psychiatric procedures. Assagioli lists four stages, and where crises occur. He refers to a crisis with spiritual awakening, a crisis preceding the spiritual awakening, and one occurring after the awakening.

Men seem to live without much difficulty in a materially oriented atmosphere; they make money; they have children; they have girl friends; they carry on their life and seem to be quite happy until around 35 maybe 40 years of age. All of a sudden things fall, and they just don't get any fun out of what they are doing. Something may happen; it may be the loss of a loved one, a relative or something of that nature, and they will have an inner awakening. They do not understand it, and do not appreciate that they are having a new experience. Some become depressed, sensitive, conscientious, and then they feel a sense of guilt and remorse, and at some point they may even entertain ideas of suicide. As they see that they are not getting something out of life they begin to say "Who am I?" "What am I doing here?" "What is the purpose in life?" "Why is it that these things don't satisfy me any more?" They begin to ask questions of value.

Now as they begin to ask them, most of us who have not had the experience would have no way of actually understanding it. The tendency is, as soon as the man becomes more conscientious - he may give up drinking or may give up a few things that he has been doing - there is a tendency for his friends to say, "Well, Joe, you are doing it the wrong way; what's the matter? you are becoming more religious or something?" This may tend to drive him into a feeling of despondency and depression because he has the feeling of being different from other people when this occurs. The spiritual awakening itself can give him a lot of difficulty. The inner experience - this experience of this inner self in many instances can set off a conflict within the patient. Dr. Assagioli gives a case-history of a little man who was persistently declaring that he was God; apart from this he was perfectly rational in every respect. He was helpful to other people, but his awakening to this spiritual reality was such that he decided he was some kind of a messiah or something of that nature.

Several very interesting books pursue this subject; one preacher (Boisen) insisted that many psychotic diseases were actually some manifestation of this spiritual awakening. He was a patient in psychiatric hospitals on several occasions, usually catatonic; but he developed chaplains' groups that are now going into mental hospitals for clinical training. George Christian Anderson tells us that if a man feels that he has seen God, how can you tell him that he hasn't?

In what we call psychosis there may be some awakening of this inner self, with the psychosis only a reaction to it. I think I have seen several of

these myself, and I keep looking for them. After the spiritual awakening occurs this feeling doesn't last long; some react to it and may go the other way, instead of becoming more spiritual these people may suddenly become more materialistic. It seems as if the ego, which has been disrupted, may suddenly exert itself and say "Look, you are on the wrong trail, you are doing it wrong." Then for a period the persons may immerse themselves in anti-social or immoral activity. Manic reactions may occur at this stage. But he doesn't enjoy it; his conscience hurts him; he knows it's wrong; then there is a conflict between this new moral consciousness which has developed and his old style of living; and he needs a lot of help and understanding at this time.

Dr. Assagioli quotes from Plato - in the 7th Book of the Republic - "first when any of these people that have been prisoners in a dark cave or den is liberated and compelled suddenly to stand up and turn his neck and walk towards the light he will suffer sharp pains. The glare will distress him and he will be unable to see the realities of which in his former state he has seen only in shadows." And then St. John of the Cross used these words; speaking of the condition called 'the dark night of the soul': "The self is in the dark because it is blinded by a light greater than it can bear. The more clear the light, the more does it blind the eyes of the owl." Then he goes on to state that "the soul perceives itself to be so unclean and miserable that it seems as if God has set Himself against it and itself were set against God." So that persons having a reaction along this line may respond to it by becoming more immoral or more moral, or it may even precipitate a psychosis, a disturbance of the psycho-neurotic process.

In other words, it seems as if some who have this awakening of this inner self, will come to us, as physicians and as healers, for help. They may not know of this spiritual wakening or awakening of this inner self - and frequently neither will the physician know! In many instances he doesn't help with this problem of the awakening of this inner self.

As Dr. Tournier said, in his practice as a surgeon so many of his patients wanted to talk about values that he decided that he would begin a clinic at night in his home. He said, "As a physician I can't talk about values but I am interested in them myself, so let's talk about them at home."

In a short period of time his night practice became so much more interesting than his day practice that he gave up his day practice of surgery and began to work with patients on this problem of values; "why? who am I?, what am I doing?, what is the purpose of living?" They were awakening to this new sensation; and most of them were in their thirties, forties and 50 years of age. Because of our aging population, we don't see this too much in the younger groups, although we do see it occasionally.

So from a psychiatric standpoint, to sum up this discussion, we are seeing reactions today which we are beginning to learn something about. We have to go beyond the classical theory of Freud, of the id, ego, super-ego, structure of the mind, and postulate that there are other structures present which have to do with creativity, with will, with an awakening of a conscience which is above the one which we ordinarily see in our regular activities. This awakening of this center which is in every individual comes out only as a result of some traumatic value experience; or sometimes spontaneously after 35 years of age. We choose in psychosynthesis to call this entity "Self"; and I'll open the discussion now. I think we'll start with Pat Mullahy who has been working very hard on the subject "The Ontology of Self."

Mullahy: I am sorry I didn't have really as much time to discuss as many problems as I should like to have done . Incidentally, I was thinking, as Dr. Cooper was talking, about aging population in relation to this subject, and I was reminded that Santayana said young people do not think, they feel, they live more or less instinctively. So perhaps it is when one approaches middle age that one really begins to take a serious view of life and its problems. Dr. Rouke at the last meeting asked me to discuss the psychoanalytic theories of the self, but subsequently he suggested that instead I discuss the self from a more philosophical point of view and that is what I have done. But as I said previously I didn't have enough time to do as much work on this as I should like, and will begin with the quotation from Allport on the self:

"The self" he says, "is something of which we are immediately aware. We think of it as the warm central private region of our life. As such it plays a crucial part in our consciousness (a concept broader than self), in our personality (a concept broader than consciousness), and in our organism (a concept broader than personality). Thus it is some kind of core in our being. And yet it is not a constant core. Sometimes the core expands and seems to take command of all our behavior and consciousness, sometimes it seems to go completely off stage, leaving us with no awareness whatsoever of self."

The problem of the self is difficult for several reasons, as Allport points out in Pattern and Growth in Personality (pp.110-111):

- A. The term self is used in a great many ways by great many theorists, often the term ego is employed instead.
- B. Although each of us has an acute awareness of self we cannot tell just what we are aware of; some talks and acts seem to us more self-relevant than others, but there is no sharp dividing line. Therefore it is impossible to fix boundaries to our definition.
- C. The subject opens up profound philosophical dilemmas concerning the nature of man, of 'soul', of freedom and immortality."

Psychologists and psychiatrists with rare exception try to avoid such problems. In the first place they rarely have any knowledge of philosophy, in fact they tend to regard philosophy as cloudy profitless speculation. Hence they are often unaware of the fact the problems exist. Second, psychologists and psychiatrists generally pride themselves on being scientists and their model of science and scientific methods is borrowed from the natural sciences. Experimental methods is usually their ideal, although one of the oldest natural sciences, astronomy, certainly is not an experimental science. However, I want to say in passing that I am not opposed to experimental methods in psychology whenever it can deal with the problem at hand. The question is: can the most important problems of psychology, problems of emotion and motivation, of thinking, of willing, be studied adequately by experimental methods?

Another related idea which psychologists have adopted from the physical scientists is determinism. Determinism is really very old, far older than modern science, for example you find it in the great Greek philosopher Democritus. In its strictest meaning determinism is a doctrine that there is an invariable relation between various kinds of elements. Thus the search for causes is, as Collingwood and Nagel put it in their book Logic and Scientific Methods, a search for some invariable relation between elements and factors. Curiously, they do not mention David Hume in this connection, who placed the whole notion of invariable relation in nature as very much open to doubt. Nowadays, of course, a somewhat different notion of determinism is often expressed; causal relationships are said

to be, to rest on, statements of probability. Even so, the notion of determinism persists, and it is accepted as far as I know by all natural scientists. A recent writer, Father James E. Royce, in his book Man and his Nature distinguishes three kinds of determinism.

There is, first, physical determinism. This doctrine claims "that the only cause for activity is the physical stimulus evoking a physical and automatic response." S R theory is a familiar example - Watson and company!

Second, there is psychological determinism. The S R formula is replaced by the more adequate SOR Formula. It recognizes that there are so-called intervening variables: emotion, motivation, images and so forth. According to the doctrine of psychological determinism the intervening variables wholly determine the cause of action. I quote from Father Royce: "According to this theory if one knew all the previous and present mental states, conscious and unconscious influences, one could predict with infallible certainty any behavior." It seems to me - and I am speaking for myself now - that this notion is untestable; no one can ever know everything about another person, or even about himself. A strict operationist, if he is consistent, would have to rule it out no matter what his scientific pretensions.

The third kind of determinism is theological determinism. I quote from Father Royce: "This view holds that God's cooperation determines the will act." I think this view belongs to theology and is outside the purposes of this discussion, as well as being beyond my competence. As for the physical determinism previously mentioned I have always thought that Watson and company are silly; and I need not, I think, discuss their ideas here, though. I have discussed their ideas elsewhere in the past and published criticisms of their naive notions.

The solution which Father Royce offers is somewhat similar in certain respects, though by no means identical, with the view I set forth in a paper called Will, Choice and Ends - in 1949, when I was young and in a hurry! Father Royce claims there is a middle ground between indeterminism and psychological determinism, a position he calls moderate in-determinism. He also characterizes "the doctrine of free choice, rather than free will, since it is the act of choice which is free." He says, "man is free in his act of choice." It is called self-determination because in contrast to the theory of uncritical indeterminism, of uncaused act, it insists that the self is a true cause while in contrast to the determinists it insists that under proper conditions man determines his own choice rather than being determined wholly by internal or external influences. In other words, Father Royce believes that while there must be adequate motive to act, a motive is not a necessitating cause; it does not compel one, at least under normal conditions of life. I quote: "The ego or self is the cause which determines which motive shall prevail; the question is not whether motive attracts or whether one motive is greater or weaker than another, but whether the motive necessitates. The adequate cause of human behavior must include the entire phenomenological field, including the agent himself." By motive Father Royce means any specific goal or object which at a conscious level directs conduct, regardless of whether it is sensory or rational.

A motive is more or less synonymous with incentive, it should not be confused with need, which signifies a lack of something, nor with drive which is a tension or tendency to act caused by an unfulfilled need, whether physiological or acquired or developed. The drive is a tension state consequent upon that need; it is usually rather indeterminate until directed by a specific

incentive or goal. There is then, on this view, under normal conditions of life no inner drive which forces or necessitates one to act as though one were a machine. Reason, knowledge and experience can supervene. Reason, knowledge and experience are, in the main, part of the self. Because of such attributes of the self one can normally decide between competing tendencies and between alternate goals or incentives. Furthermore, it is not necessary for the normal person, as Father Royce said, to know all the factors that might be impelling him in order for him to behave himself. "I may not know why I feel I want to hit the person but normally I can choose not to hit him."

It seems to me that if we take our experience seriously and not try to explain it away or reduce it to something simpler like Head, we must accept the fact that our thinking has causal efficacy. For example, I learned that I can walk home or take the subway or hire a taxi. It would be sheer dogmatism to assert that some obscure inner drive forced me to do one thing rather than another. To be sure my own nature and the nature of the world imposes limitations on me; I can't fly home. It is also true that I will decide, if I am rational, if I can think clearly after a consideration of the actual conditions that obtain; whether for example, the distance may be so great that I will get very tired if I walk home, or a taxi may be expensive relative to my meager financial resources, but I know on the basis of past experience and introspection that I can choose which course to adopt. If I do not know this then I do not know anything, or I am psychotic. For it is the same "I" which knows everything else, the same "I" who can perceive the paper I am writing on, the same "I" who can love and hate, feel sorrow or delight. Of course, I sometimes misjudge, perhaps because of inadequate knowledge, perhaps because of emotional factors of which I may or may not be conscious. These considerations merely tell me that I am a limited, finite, being, that I am a man and not a God.

The point I am trying to make is that we know from our own experience that we can choose, that our choices are limited by our human nature and personal adequacy. Why must we deny the reality of our own experience for the sake of an unprovable dogma or the currently fashionable tenets of a quasi-scientific psychology? Every hour and every minute of every day I experience my ability to perceive objects in the world. Why should I belittle my experience? Is it not equally true, does not my experience also teach me that I can choose, that I have the ability to choose? Consider the evidence that is offered against it, does anyone who has seriously studied psychology or philosophy really believe on the basis of the evidence offered by Freud or Sullivan or any and all schools of psychology, that free will or rational choice has been disproved? It would not take more than an hour to demonstrate conclusively that the claims of psychological determinism on the matter of free will are spurious.

Perhaps if psychologists had a solid grounding in epistemology and the logic of scientific method they would not so uncritically accept these spurious claims of psychological determinism. Also, a few of the more analytically minded psychologists admit, as with Marx and Hillix in Systems and Theories in Psychology, that, and I quote: "Determinism amounts mostly to an act of faith since at best our knowledge can be only partially complete." (p.164)

One extremely difficult problem I want to mention in passing is this: if I say my mind or my thinking has causal efficacy I seem to say or imply that a non-material or spiritual entity can act upon and move a material entity, my body. This would immediately raise questions about the nature of mind and of body and their relation. Are they two basically different substances as St. Augustine, Descartes, Locke and others held? If they are, how can a spiritual operation

such as reasoning affect such a radically and basically different entity, the body. No satisfactory answer has ever been given to my knowledge to this problem, as it is stated. Philosophers still carry on a great deal of controversy, working on such assumptions. But perhaps they are not two different kinds of substance as Aristotle, Aquinas and many others, such as Father Royce, argue but are one composite substance wherein the soul, as Aristotle has it is a form of the body and the principle of life, of sensing and of thinking.

Father Copleston in his History of Philosophy interprets Aquinas as follows: "In a plant there is present only the vegetative principle or soul conferring life and the principles of growth and reproduction. In the animal there is present only the sensitive soul which acts as a principle not only of vegetative life but also of sensitive life. In man there is present only the rational principle or soul which is not only the principle of the operations peculiar to itself but also the vegetative and sensitive functions." There is then, on the Thomistic view, as I understand it, no substantial form or principle of life in man other than the rational soul. It is this soul which exercises the functions of inferior forms, vegetative and sensitive. Again I quote from Father Coplestone: "The human soul has the power of sensation, for example, but cannot exercise this function without a body, it has the power of intellection but has no innate ideas (as Descartes believed, for example) and has to form its ideas in dependence on sense experience, for which it needs a body. The soul then, is united to a body because it needs it, because it is naturally the form of a body."

Finally, I want to mention James's theory of the self. In the traditional philosophical views which I have mentioned there is a fundamental distinction between the soul and its powers, and faculties, and between the faculties themselves. I am over-simplifying a bit, for there certainly is a difference between the philosophy of Thomas and Locke; but we will leave that aside as I do not have to go into it for my purposes today.

Thus we experience the operations of the soul, such as willing and thinking, but we do not observe the soul itself. You cannot take a man into a laboratory and test to see if he has a soul; the soul is transcendental and unitary. According to Father Royce substance is not a static and knowable substratum as Locke believed, for example. It is existing reality, dynamic and changing, knowable by philosophical analysis. James, however, relegated the soul to metaphysics. He studied what he called "the empirical self." Whether or not the empirical self has a spiritual substratum is a question which James thought did not belong in psychological science. The self, for James, is rather similar to the view I quoted from Allport, although Allport leaves the question of a substantial self open as does James. Consciousness, for James, is an evolutionary outcome; its basic function is biological adaptation; the self is not synonymous with consciousness; it would include our faculties and dispositions. In James's theory of the self there are two major aspects: I, or the knower and Me, and the known. James had great difficulty with the "I" or pure ego; the "I" is that which is at any moment conscious, whereas the "me" is only one of the things of which it is conscious. The "I" retains a functional identity - "I know my states of consciousness, yesterday and today"; but for psychology the hypothesis of a substantial principle of unity, soul, is - as James thought - superfluous. But James was unable to account for the existence of the "I," the thinker, except in a vague speculative fashion. It is notorious that James got bogged down when he tried to deal with this problem. Despite differences in details, psychoanalysts hold to the theory of an empirical self and reject the idea of a substantial self; but whilst James was a voluntarist, psychoanalysts generally are strict determinists. Jung, Adler and Rank are, I think, also voluntarists but their interpretations of the self are not systematic and are rather vague.

In academic psychology a few people like Gordon Allport are aware that the self and its nature demands a re-thinking, so I conclude by saying our ignorance of the whole area is profound.

- - -

Rouke: Pat, would you identify self with soul? (Mullahy: Yes, I think I would.) Just the soul alone - spiritual principle, not including the rest of man?

Mullahy: Well, I would certainly include all of man; the soul is not something separate from the body; the two together form one substance, a composite substance; so it would be more accurate to say that I accept the notion of a substantival self. Now, in my present state of thinking I am not certain as to the ultimate nature of this substantival self. It raises very profound problems of a theological and philosophical nature, which I freely confess I am not right now able to solve.

Adkins: What would your idea be as to what happens to soul when the body dies? (Mullahy: I do not know the answer.)

Hilton: I would like to make a comment, Pat, on your question from James where he referred to soul being in the realm of metaphysics, and of no concern to psychology. "Metaphysical" simply means, of course, beyond the physical.

This last week I happened to read an article by Taylor, who is a research scientist at the Clayton Foundation Biochemical Institute of the University of Texas, and he, I think, is pioneering in his field as we are in regard to the concept of the self - or rather, Self. There are a few scientists - and I think Taylor is one of them - who are groping in this same direction. For instance, he says: "Neither the data of science nor ordinary human experience offers any support for the idea that organization can arise without intelligent supervision of the forces and conditions which bring it about....The course of evolution which consists of the development of progressive order in structure and actions, is a reflection of something in the category of mind. Since scientific knowledge implies that the diversity of nature is an expression of an underlying unity in law and essence, then it follows that it is the universal intelligence or mind which is expressed in the organization of the universe and in all its subdivisionsThe concept we are advancing necessitates the deduction that we as human beings are particular reflections of universal intelligence, and our minds must function according to the general principles which apply to all nature....The concept that mind, as reflected in organization, is the reality in nature, unites all aspects of the universe, as we know it through science, into a consistent whole."

Taylor is bringing forward an idea fatastic to many scientists - he is starting with mind and posits that the physical is an expression of what he calls the basic underlying unity. So he is really giving priority to what we could call the metaphysical angle.

Luke: Does he deny the existence of independent minds? It would appear so...

Hilton: No, I do not think so; but it does, I think, have relevance to Teilhard de Chardin's ideas in his book Phenomenon of Man. We have individuality within a collectivity, unity in diversity. However, the quotation was an attempt to bring into the meeting the scientific approach to what lies beyond the physical, or to what underlies the whole structure of the universe.

Luke: On this earlier question, as to what happens to the soul after it separates from the body, Rahner has a theory - and I think it would fit in with what was said in Mullahy's paper. When the soul dis-engages itself from this organized bit of matter, because it is human spirit it has to be related to some matter and therefore it enters into relationship with the totality of the material universe; there is never such a thing as a human spirit that gets completely dissociated from matter; this is part of its constituency. This might explain some of the ESP business. There may be some validity to the notion that it is impossible for the human spirit to become completely disembodied; it must have some relationship to matter, and instead of being "a-cosmic," as Rahner phrases it, instead of going "out of the cosmos" and the material universe it becomes "pan-cosmic"; the separated Soul is no longer the substantial form of this bit of organized matter which I call my body, but it becomes related to the totality of materiality, somehow. (Karl Rahner: The Theology of Death)

Rouke: There was one other thing you mentioned, Pat, about most psychoanalysts being deterministic. Now I think it is true that in their theoretical writing they are deterministic, but do you not think that in practice the analyst or the psychiatrist who works with a patient tries to make him better in terms of his ability to accept responsibility for what he does?

Mullahy: Yes, I agree, in practice they do not employ determinism.

Cooper: The only comment I would make is this: I have a patient, referred in by an analyst who had been working with the patient for 4 or 5 years; but with this different approach, of the idea that she was faced with psychological disturbances involving self-realization, she improved dramatically. I received indirectly a letter from the analyst who wrote something like this: "It is obvious that the patient is improving but tell Cooper to leave off that oriental philosophy - stick to something practical!" (Rouke: What is more practical than what works?!) Here again is another example of that viewpoint: In 1957 I was what you would call a materialistic psychiatrist, but then I experienced this "self"; and had my battle, and now I think I understand some of the aspects. However, I was listening to Viktor Frankl speaking in Houston, along with some 60 members of the Psychiatric Society (I was secretary of the group); Frankl was speaking about the "noetic experience"; he was describing some of the things which he had experienced in a concentration camp in Europe and apparently he had survived by means of a mechanism, which he was trying to explain. At the end of the session you could feel that the atmosphere was that of derision. "What is he saying? What is he trying to get over?" and so on; in fact a number of the psychiatrists in the group just could not grasp what it was that he was talking about; whereas I thought he was talking directly to me. And in thinking back over the meeting I see that the difference was that I had had an experience, Viktor Frankl had had an experience, but the other doctors had not. And until they can have an experience, I do not think that they can even begin to talk or think in terms like this.

I am surprised at Roy Grinker Sr. who, during World War II brought to us the so-called truth serum - sodium pentathol - to help relieve people of emotional problems, and yet he now makes the statement that our experiments and working in the scientific gathering of facts re LSD and things of that nature is to be deplored. Which, I think, means that Roy Grinker has not had an experience. For instance, when I first started teaching psychiatry, I was trying just to get over to the students the psychological problems of patients. One of my students stood up one day and said: "Doctor, I know that woman is sick, but I do not know how!" and the tears were streaming from his eyes because he could not

see, feel or hear this kind of reaction. He was having difficulty just at the emotional level; a therapist will have difficulty in going beyond the emotional level to this higher level in consciousness. So it is my feeling that when the therapist has an experience, and survives, he will be in a better position to help.

Adkins: I would like to go into one of the points which Pat Mullahy raised in his very thought-provoking presentation. He seemed to imply that because no one can explain how a non-material entity can influence a material entity, it is therefore not legitimate to think the self is a non-material entity. I would ask: Why, as scientists, are we required to explain how an interaction works before we are allowed to recognize that it does work? The interaction between magnetism and electricity was recognized long before any consistent theory could be attempted in order to try to explain it.

Dr. Assagioli, in the manual, encourages us to think of the essence of ourselves as a center of pure self-consciousness which is a dynamic power capable of observing, mastering, directing and using all the psychological processes and the physical body. Dr. Assagioli recognizes an interaction between the psychological processes and the physical body on the one hand, and something else which he calls the essence of ourselves on the other. Why is it not good scientific procedure to recognize the existence of such an interaction even though we cannot explain how it works?

A scientist makes a hypothesis on the basis of what he observes empirically and then he checks and rechecks the hypothesis against the observed phenomena. This is the scientific revolution of the last 300 years, and it has produced an amazing amount of workable knowledge of the physical world. Why may we not use this same method in hypothesizing about non-material entities, if the observed phenomena seem to call for such hypothesizing?

Brother Luke quoted a German philosopher who made a case for speculation. It is good to remind ourselves that science needs speculation, with the proviso that we must rigorously keep our speculations dependent upon the empirical evidence. As F.R. Tennant says, "Science is fact-controlled speculation."

Mullahy: The psychiatrists, it seems to me, do a great deal of speculation; but they will not speculate if you want to go beyond a certain point; they are unwilling to accept any evidence that goes beyond their own particular ideology. There is one point that I guess you did not get in this paper of mine; namely, you are assuming along with contemporary thought generally, as Father Royce mentioned, that you are making the Lockean assumption that the person is made up of two basically, radically different substances or entities - the mind being one and the body being the other. Now he points out that Aristotle did not conceive of the person in this way, neither did Aquinas. There is only one entity, the person.

Adkins: Yes, I understand the point you were making, Pat, and I agree with contemporary thought that we no longer can regard the body and the mind as a dichotomy. Modern knowledge convinces us by the body-mind unity.

Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind has ably summed up the findings of the behavioral sciences to the effect that the mind is not a separate existent but rather one phase of the operation of the body-mind complex. Ryle ridicules the idea of the mind as a separate existent by contemptuously using the phrase "a ghost in the machine." But he fails to see, as do some other modern

thinkers, that accepting the body-mind unity does not debar us, as scientists, from postulating the existence of an initiating, choosing self which is not subsumed under the body-mind complex.

Of course, anyone persisting in the idea of a dichotomy in the human personality - in this case, between the body-mind complex on the one hand and the initiating, choosing self on the other - has a good deal in common with Locke. And as I read the history of philosophy, a good deal in common with Aristotle and Aquinas.

Today, however, as the beneficiaries of modern knowledge, we can see what earlier thinkers could not see, that the dichotomy needs to be delineated at a different place - that is, not within the body-mind complex but outside of it.

The new dichotomy is admittedly speculative but modern science does not require us to refrain from speculation provided that we tie speculation to the phenomena as observed. The specific phenomenon of which we are speaking is the fact that the essential self of a human being is able to observe, master and direct the psycho-physical processes of his personality structure. We do not have to stop speculating about the interaction of the self, even considered as non-material, with the body-mind complex merely because we cannot explain it.

Rouke: Well, there is no reason why we should stop. The other question I have - to get back to the attitude of psychiatrists and determinism - I think that some of their reluctance to accept the concept of the spiritual entity in man is that they feel that if this is accepted, they accept a capacity for freedom in man and therefore eliminating the fact of unconscious motivation; and this is not at all so. You see, we can have all kinds of environmental stimuli, all kinds of internal stimuli, all kinds of emotional stimuli, influencing our activities; and there is no doubt that this occurs. As a matter of fact, the basic principle of the whole Thomistic knowledge of man is that man can exercise full freedom only when he is freed from these limiting factors; and that when emotion surges up freedom is diminished.

Luke: Well, that is based on the fact that matter is by its nature determined, and so anything affecting the material side of man is a very definitely determined thing. If someone were to put cyanide into a cream pitcher for example, there is a deterministic mechanism that would operate that would have us all lying on the floor; and the same could be true if you want to accept Freudian theory about problems in toilet training and that sort of thing. These are things that affect the mechanical structure of man and that can have long lasting effects throughout life. There is no problem there as far as Thomistic theory is concerned, because these are determinations that are made precisely in that aspect of man's nature which is determinable. If you say that aspects of body behavior are determined, you are simply saying that the material part of man's nature is material. When the undetermined part of man's nature begins to operate then there is already this brief history of determination in the years before the use of reason.

Adkins: Yes, then you have, if you put forward the theory of the deterministic side of one's nature, namely the body and personality structure, the body-mind is completely and utterly determined; then if you hypothesize another element which is somehow of a different nature, then the problem is the interaction between the two. So in that you have man as the interaction between these two things; now the fact that you cannot explain how they interact does not seem to me that it rules out your chance to hypothesize that they do interact.

Luke: Thomistic philosophy, if anyone is interested in that, insists that nothing gets into the mind except that it comes through the body. The problem there is interaction between body and spirit, and not only is the interaction a problem but the greater problem is "Where is the dividing line between the two?" In the modern physical theory, where you keep splitting matter up until you get down to energy particles, you are getting down into something that acts very much like spirit. Where that dividing line comes is a crucial problem; but I do not think that that is the problem of the self; the interaction of matter and spirit is not the problem of the self; I think that this is another problem; this is a transcendent notion. The self has to operate through both spirit and body; it is not identifiable with either or their combinations.

Cooper: I think this is the point, and I am glad you made it. (Adkins: Would you make that point again please, Brother Luke?)

Luke: The self is not the soul-mind complex, not the spirit; and the self is not the body; and neither is it a combination of them. It operates through the two but transcends them both.

Adkins: Self is not the soul-mind complex? (Luke: No. Your body is just as much your self as your mind is, and just as much not your self as the mind is.)

Cooper: One way to think of it is as a transformer.

Luke: We get some insights into this from theology, and whether you accept the reality of this is not to the point; but in traditional Catholic theology I think we have three things: first of all, the doctrine about the self of Jesus - Jesus was a divine self who operated through two natures: human nature, complete body-soul. He had no human self. In Catholic doctrine Jesus was not a human person; he was a divine person operating through his human-mind-body complex, and also operating at the same time and simultaneously (and this, of course, is a theological mystery) through his total divinity. That is one example where self - as I think you can see conceptually - is divorced from the body-soul complex. Here you have the complete body-soul complex, but the Person who Jesus is is neither of these; he transcends them. (Adkins: Jesus is not a self?) He is a self, but he is not a human self; the only self Jesus has is a divine self - in Catholic doctrine. That is one example.

Another would be that God Himself as Self is three Selves - three Selves manipulate this one divine intelligence; it is manipulated by three distincts selfs - Father, Son and Spirit; and whatever divinity does, each one of these three Persons, these three Selves, manipulate. That is the second example.

The third example would be - if there is any empirical reality to it at all - in the concept of diabolical possession. Here you have a person who thinks his own thoughts and makes his own choices and operates through his own body, but then, presumably, an evil spirit takes possession. There is a lot of doubt cast about most of the actual cases, and most of them, I suppose, are hysterical. But we do have examples in the gospel where the evil spirit starts screaming out things which are not the thoughts or expressions of the person, but are the thoughts of the demon expressed through this mind; the will chooses to express them through the functions of this body; they have nothing to do with the person at all; it is the diabolical spirit that takes over the total operation. (Adkins: Well, is the spirit a self?) No. Take, for example, take we seven people here; according to this theory each one of us here is conscious of himself as self,

because we have seven separate bodies, seven sets of thought processes, of will operation, and seven sets of emotion; but there isn't anything intrinsically inconsistent with the notion that there could be only one body in this room, and one intelligence and will, which the seven of us might manipulate in turn, or use in turn - something like the family car! Because we are limited natures we would have to take turns at it, which the Trinity does not have to do! For example, one of us could have this set of faculties at 2 o'clock, another of us at 3 and 4, and so on, and yet each one of us could still be our separate selves even though we all operate it through the one set of mind-body complexes. As I was saying a minute ago, the self is something that transcends the pure combination of body-soul faculties.

Hilton: I wonder, in speaking about this connection between the self and the mind-body, if possibly this is where we move into the area of the will.

Luke: No; because when I say mind-body, I include the will. The will would be simply another faculty, like the mind. But I do not think that will constitute self either.

Hilton: But keeping it down to purely psychological levels. (Luke: Will is not an entity.) I agree, not an entity; but is not the will an essential faculty of this self that we have been speaking of?

Luke: It is the capacity to choose, that is all. It follows after mind, it is a power of spirit. It is not identifiable with the self either. The self has three operations: the self knows abstractly, that is mind; it makes a choice, that's will; the self eats a sandwich and that is body and so on, but the self is the responsible principle which acts through these powers, and transcends any one of the powers.

Hilton: But is it not the impulsing factor?

Cooper: What Frank is throwing in is a bit of dynamite, which we need to explore. When we begin to think of the will we are entering into another phase. If we think of our self on different levels we will also have to think of our will on different levels; and what kind of inner strength this is - which is will, which one person seems to be able to follow and another person seems to have more difficulty in following. There seem to be some gradations, and when we experience this self, and understand it, all of a sudden will is present. We are able to do more; so it is tied in in some way.

Luke: Is that a problem of self, or a problem of the inter-relation between matter and spirit? Let me propose an example. There are obviously various bodily functions over which we have voluntary control. Some people can wiggle their ears, or you can get into things like yoga and the fakir and all that sort of thing, where people by training force their will and develop an extraordinary ability to control their bodies. Is that a strong assertion of the self or is this simply making a stronger link between the body-spirit complex?

Cooper: Let me tackle it from another angle. Let us go back to St. Paul for a moment; he gave us a description of love - kind, patient, tolerant and so on. Now I can practice all day long kindness, patience, tolerance, but my heart may not be in it and I will not be able to really feel or be those qualities. For instance, some of my patients have an hostility index that is so high that although they know they have to gain these attributes they cannot. But if this same individual has an experience of this inner self then all of a sudden these

attributes are there; they are the product, the fruit of the spirit - as St. Paul said. So I believe that this will is a part of the self experience. You can undertake physical disciplines, give up meat, follow rules and regulations and so on, but it does not make us feel this way; but after we have had an experience of this entity that Assagioli refers to as Self, then all of a sudden you have this will.

Luke: That is why I am perfectly willing to accept the motion that you underline so strongly - that this self is unitary; but I do not like to tie it too closely to will, to mind, or anything. (Cooper: We do!) Self involves pulling the whole thing together, because first you have to have a little bit of insight, then the will to do, and finally the action as it operates through the body.

Cooper: A man like Walt Whitman, who is written up in Bucke's Cosmic Consciousness, was certainly not a spiritual person in any way from what we can gather - he certainly did not follow the moral trends of the time, but after this experience of this inner self he was then able to translate inner feeling into outer manifestation.

Rouke: Can I throw something in? It is not the answer, but it may give someone an idea that will lead us closer. Would this experience that you described earlier in the meeting be by any chance, the time in one's life when the super-ego as a control mechanism has reached its low point, and conscience as a control mechanism has definitely taken over? As I see it, super-ego is mainly a function of fear of loss of approval. Now if we can diminish super-ego to the extent that we are free from fear, then will can come in. The more we are dominated by super-ego the less freedom we can use. If we can get super-ego pretty much out of the picture, the concept of conscience and self-direction with the person operating free from fear takes over. Do you think that this has something to do with it? Is this why it may tie in with the concept of will?

Cooper: It helps. In the psychological reaction to the experience of the self there is a great amount of fear. Most of the descriptions of this phenomenon speak of gradations of fear, ecstasy, some type of emotional response - which may go on for several days or weeks. And from the psychological standpoint what Dr. Rouke is asking is "Is this a maturation of conscience, is it a maturing process, or is this something that comes in as we experience this inner self?" This is the problem; for we do see emotional experiences with it. I have detailed some of these cases where patients would just cry for hours, and then there came relief, and freedom from fear. They no longer worry about dying or their problems. They seem to have solved an existential problem. With Medina's treatment of inhalation of 70% oxygen, 30% CO₂ we got a reaction in patients in which they told us that they "died and went to heaven and that they had walked around on the other side." And we knew then that their psychological problems were cleared. The experience under carbon dioxide only lasts 3 to 5 seconds but it seems to them as if it has lasted for a life time as their time sense is distorted. They go back into the same situation that they were in before, but it does not bother them any more for they now have a new outlook on life; they have a new way of experiencing life - because they say they have gone over to the other side, have seen it and it is not bad and they are no longer frightened of death. So your point is well taken, Dr. Rouke.

Rouke: I was thinking of another thing, too. Concerning the quotations from St. John of the Cross, in terms of the concentration of writings of the mystics on the negative side. I would like to ask Brother Luke whether, since so many of

ful interpersonal relationships. You can ask: "who really are the personalities in here?" It won't be the withdrawn ones, where there are no outgoing processes of knowledge and communication, love. Or you can say: "Here you are, a bunch of 21 year old kids, looking forward to marriage; don't you think of self-fulfillment in this experience of knowledge and love?" Then they can begin to see that it is this inter-personal subjectivity which is the real constituent which makes them themselves, makes the self "self." (Mullahy: That is terrific from a theologian!)

Cooper: Let me put in a point here, because I still want to answer this question. With ordinary psychotherapeutic techniques the patients generally return; but when they have had an experience of this inner Self, as here, they no longer need the therapist and they become centers of help to other people - which is just exactly what you are saying; this distinguishes it from the ordinary psychological therapy. It may be a maturation of conscience, but I have doubts.

Rouke: I have just got another idea from what Brother Luke was saying: when he talked about the child reared in isolation; it would have no concept of self. Now this, I think, is how we all get our concept of self in early life: it is mirrored in the reactions in the people around us. We see ourselves and feel our worth in the mirror of their attitudes towards us. Again, as we grow towards maturity, it may be, that instead of seeing ourselves in the mirror, this experience comes when we manage to see the reality of self, when we know our self in some way directly - rather than in the mirror of someone else's attitude. How it happens is something else again.

Luke: This outgoing relationship has to be inter-personal; and this is one of the big emphases too. And here is why you can talk to students about the difference between the love relationship with the girl they really love and intend to marry and the one they may have with some tramp whom they pick up on a Friday night. This is not an inter-personal relationship, and they can see this because they are using this other person as "a thing," this other person becomes an instrument of pleasure. And they do not become more themselves in this type of relationship precisely because it is not interpersonal. When they as persons, as selves, go out to someone else in a reciprocal interpersonal back and forth relationship, where it is personal on both sides, both persons become conscious of self as self.

Cooper: More of this is going to help - do keep it up!

Mullahy: I would like to ask Brother Luke a question - all this is fascinating; I mean a theologian with the interpersonal theory! That is why I would like to ask, for I do not really understand your notion of the self as being somehow exterior to the composite. In addition to that, I wonder why you also say that the self is exterior to the composite in view of the fact that you claim the self grows in interpersonal relations.

Luke: Well, first of all I did not use the word "exterior" (words lost in cross talk) and secondly I did not say "exterior to." It transcends it. In other words the self is something above and beyond this; the self is the principle which operates through this combination; the self has no meaning and could not have any existence (except in the divine mysteries) unless it existentially operated through a body-spirit combination. The self is still something different. What am I? I am a man; and if I asked around the room: "What are you?" a man or a mouse?"; we would all have to answer "man"; and "Who am I?" I am Brother Luke and so on, and each one would give his name for himself. There is something in the name for the self that is special; it somehow transcends and at the same time operates through this soul-body thing. I don't know what else to

these people are Spanish or Latin - their writings, emotionally, are tremendously exaggerated - I was thinking of St. Catherine of Sienna and the fantastic emotional way in which she writes - it is not the way an Anglo-Saxon would experience things. Are these writings of St. John, St. Theresa and the others very different from what they would be for a group of people in our culture?

Luke: My impression of reading any of the history of spiritual behavior, and even schools of spirituality, is that this is all very deeply rooted in whatever stage of psychological theory may be prevalent at the time. Some of the people in our Order are in rather high places because they are good at taking men off to a retreat and leading them to an intense sort of commitment. Maybe there is a little bit of professional jealousy here! They are not good theologians so much as good amateur psychologists who will "brain wash" these people into the point where they make strong religious resolutions.

One technique is to persuade men to get in the habit of facing God for 15 minutes each day and making what is called a whole "white" act, something like a whole circle, completely white. The idea is that you go there before the Lord every day and resolve to make your day come out completely "white." Now in your achievement it may be two thirds white, or one half white, or your batting average may be 300, which isn't bad, but every day you go back there and make it all "white" again. Now this is purely psychological (Cooper: Yes, at the emotional level.) Yes, very often this whole mystical business is tied in much more closely to psychology than it is to theology. But there is another point here: I am not sure that we have yet decided what makes the self the self. Did you (speaking to Pat Mullahy) do anything at all on the subject of contemporary personalism?

Some philosophers today seem to be getting at the notion that what existentially makes person "person," or authentic person, or psychologically aware of themselves as person, is an inter-personal subjectivity. They say that a person does not become conscious of himself really as "self" until he is involved in an inter-personal relationship with some other self. For example, and this is an insight for us from theology, in the persons of the Trinity, in the Triune God, the only thing they have to constitute themselves as distinct is this interpersonal relationship among the three Persons in an outgoing relationship one to the other, based on the divine processes of knowing and loving; the knowing process, ^{the loving process} the outgoing process, to an object known - not abstractly but experientially, and an object loved experientially, it is in this process that the self finds himself as the self going out to another self in an interpersonal subjective relationship too. (Cooper: Great! Rouke: Great!)

In discussions with the classroom students, when we are trying to make some sense out of the Trinity, I will single out three of them and say: "We have got three Persons and one nature here, and I kneel down to them and "adore" them." But then I finally challenge them all to think "what makes yourself self?" If a man is created in the image and likeness of God, and God is Tri-Self, then the self in man has to be somehow a reflection of the Triune Self. So I ask them "Supposing I take this one fellow here, say, Louis here, and all the rest of us were to leave the room, would Louis be more conscious of himself, as self, as individual person, than he would if we all stayed in the room?" And it is amazing; most of the students say that they think that he would be more himself if he were alone. And then I will say "Suppose we put it this way; suppose at birth Louis had been taken away from his mother and put into a room where machines pumped the food in and so on, so that he never had any experience of any other person; would he be more aware of himself as self?" Then, of course, students see the point immediately; and then you can build on that as to what are meaning-

say about it, but I think that psychologically you become more aware of who you are precisely - as you, the self - when you use this total complex of faculties - both spirit faculties and matter faculties - to go out in a relationship to someone else. That is what I mean by transcendent; I do not mean that it is exterior or that it has any sort of independent existence apart from this body-spirit; it operates completely through the body-spirit; all of its existence is rooted in the body-spirit and yet it is something different.

Adkins: You speak of the body-spirit; these are two things of different nature?

Luke: I presume that they are, but I do not think that that is essential in the discussion. They are related, and as I said, the dividing line between the two is getting tougher and tougher to define. The reason that I like to say "spirit" is because in spirit I include mind, emotion, will and all those things. (Adkins: Where is the self, then?) The self is something above all this.

Adkins: But you, Dr. Cooper, I think were saying that the self is the will; you were disagreeing with Brother Luke on that. Where is the self?

Luke: It is not a third entity - I do not hold that at all; it is not a third entity, exterior, manipulating this, like a marionette show. This self is somehow not like either of these two and yet has no existence and cannot express itself except that it operates these things.

Adkins: Take the animal; the animal has the mind-body complex on a vestigial scale. Does the animal have a self?

Luke: I do not think so, because when the animal dies that is it! The animal has no other meaning.

Adkins: Your idea is then that when the man dies the self goes on?

Luke: That's right - partially, because he is spirit; but that gets into the business of the substantiality of the soul, the possibility of a separate existence of his mind. But this is still not the self. (Adkins: Separate existence of the mind?) of the soul, of the spirit - that the spirit can exist apart from this bit of organized matter. (Adkins: Well, is it the spirit that goes on or the self that goes on?) That is a very interesting question. I think that lots of the philosophers would say that as long as you are disembodied spirit you are not really a self; that it is very difficult for you to be a "self" in this condition. And I think that is what drove Rahner to presume that this disembodied spirit has to have a relation to the totality of matter in order to somehow have some form of self-realization. But there you are getting into very high speculation and problems, but I think if you want to bring this down to any kind of practical level, this sense of interpersonal relationship is a major factor in awareness of self. It strikes me as being very important, even in the theoretical teaching.

Adkins: Does the animal have a spirit?...(Luke: Not that survives the body.) You are speaking of the spirit-matter interaction, and then the self as something again; now do the animals have a spirit-matter complex without the self?

Luke: Not in the same sense that man does.

Cooper: We are speaking about man at the present time, but our time is up and we must conclude.

Rouke: May I just raise one point on the self: that it has to be self-reflective. (Adkins: self-conscious?) Yes.

Cooper: The animal has the instinctual mind; man - as a general rule - has a consciousness of self. Now then, added to it is this other thing which Bucke calls "cosmic consciousness" - which is consciousness of yourself in relationship to other people in relationship to the universe.

Luke: As Frank Sheed says "if you ever find a dog that knows itself to be a dog, then you should baptise it!" (Laughter)

Cooper: On this note we shall close.

* * * *